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Abstract 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Recent studies that compare the efficiency and distributional impacts of alternative instruments to 
curb sprawl typically ignore what to do with the revenues from anti-sprawl policies, such as 
development taxes. This paper extends first-best analysis of development taxes aimed at 
preserving land at the urban fringe to account for interactions with other distortions within the 
urban system. By incorporating urban decline at the city core, which in turn, generates negative 
neighborhood spillover effects and extra pressure for development at the urban fringe, we provide 
a more complete framework to evaluate the efficiency and distributional impacts of development 
taxes. We consider three potential alternative schemes to recycle the revenues: lump sum 
recycling, earmarked revenues to purchase conservation easements that permanently save open 
space and earmarked revenues to subsidize a revitalization program at the city core. In this 
setting, when revenues from the development tax are earmarked to fund a conservation easement 
there is an additional welfare gain (relative to the lump sum case) because the threat of future 
conversation of open space is fully eliminated. Similarly, when revenues are earmarked to fund a 
revitalization program at the city core, there are additional sources of welfare that make this 
policy preferred relative to the lump-sum recycling scheme. Finally, we also explore the spatial 
distributional impacts of these three alternative recycling schemes. 
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 1. Introduction 
Because of its potential to preserve open space and promote revitalization of the urban 
core in declining cities, ‘smart growth’ strategies to curb urban sprawl have become a major U.S. 
public policy issue. Examples of anti-sprawl policies include: urban growth boundaries that limit 
development at the urban fringe, development taxes, subsidies to infill development, and 
increases in the rate of the property tax to finance the purchase of open space.1 
Recently, many analysts have cast doubt on the effectiveness of these policies. Such critics 
argue that the potential for smart growth initiatives hinges on the ability of different jurisdictions 
in a metropolitan area to coordinate their strategies to manage growth (Downs, (2003)). The 
failure of jurisdictions to coordinate can only translate into the displacement of growth from one 
jurisdiction to another, which in turn can exacerbate the externalities associated with sprawl, such 
as increases in commuting. Taken to its extreme, the argument of coordination implies the 
creation of a metropolitan wide agency responsible for the ‘vision’ of urban growth for that 
metropolitan area.2  There are at least two reasons that may justify regional coordination: First, an 
efficiency argument based on the fact that housing submarkets are linked throughout the city, and 
therefore policies enacted in one area will produce spillover effects across the entire metro region. 
These spillover effects create a rational for giving the power to regulate land to metropolitan wide 
agencies, as opposed to just local agencies. Second, there is a distributional argument based on 
the fact that the costs and benefits of anti-sprawl policies will vary across different communities, 
                                                 
1 For a review of smart growth principles and policies already implemented across the U.S., see Getting to 
Smart Growth: 100 Policies for Implementation, a document jointly produced by the City/County 
Management Association (ICMA), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Smart 
Growth Network. 
2 There are already several examples of metropolitan wide initiatives and attempts to coordinate. For 
example, in Minneapolis – St. Paul a regional tax sharing has been in place since 1971; In the State of 
Maryland, legislation since 1998 designates priority funding areas that target state funds to municipalities 
and planned growth areas. Finally, several localities in Pennsylvania use a split-rate property tax system to 
encourage development on vacant and blighted pieces of land in existing communities. 
 3
depending on their spatial location. Therefore, spatial distributional considerations may also 
justify a metropolitan wide regulatory agency. 
In this coordination scenario, one potential policy would be a metropolitan wide development 
tax per unit of land developed.  Whenever a new tax is implemented, the issue of what to do with 
its revenues becomes important. One could envision revenues earmarked to purchase permanent 
conversation easements at the urban fringe. Alternatively, revenues from a development tax could 
finance various programs at the city core that could alleviate pre-existing distortions that 
contribute to sprawl. One example would be a revitalization program in the inner city, especially 
if sprawl is also a result of a flight to the suburbs due to the decline of the city core. Indeed, an 
important practical question of interest to policymakers is whether the revenues from 
development taxes are better allocated at the city core, the fringe, or a combination of both. A 
related important issue is the measurement of the trade offs between efficiency and distributional 
impacts associated with these alternative forms of revenue-recycling. 
This paper addresses the following questions: What are the efficiency effects of metropolitan 
wide development taxes under alternative recycling schemes?  What are the (spatial) 
distributional impacts of these recycling options? That is, who wins and loses - and by how 
much- under each policy?  
To properly address these questions, there is a need to develop a consistent, spatially explicit 
framework that simultaneously captures the key aspects of the problem: the benefits of open 
space preservation at the urban fringe, the benefits of urban revitalization at the city core, and the 
connections between the various housing submarkets throughout a metro area and their various 
spillover effects.  
We extend prior literature on the economics of urban sprawl (e.g. Brueckner (2001) and 
Bento et. al (2006)) by developing a more complete, spatially-explicit framework that captures 
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several causes of urban sprawl3.  First, unlike existing studies that have examined the effects of 
policies to curb sprawl (e.g. Bento et al. (2006) and Brueckner (2001)), we model two localized 
externalities - underprovision of open space at the urban fringe (similar to previous studies) and 
urban decline at the city core that creates pressure for development at the urban fringe.4 The 
existence of urban decline at the city core provides a rationale for recycling the revenues of 
development taxes through a subsidy to improvements of the existing blighted housing stock. 
This form of revenue-recycling from development taxes can play an important role, as cities are 
struggling more and more to find sources of revenue to match federal funds to finance 
revitalization projects. Similarly, the underprovision of open space at the urban fringe also 
provides a rationale for recycling the revenues of development taxes through purchases of 
conservation easements at the fringe to permanently protect open space from future 
development5.  
Second, we provide a careful treatment of the housing market, which integrates the 
production of new housing at the fringe and alterations of the existing housing stock in the rest of 
the city. In our model, alterations of the existing housing stock occur through additions and 
improvements. With the exception of Arnott et al. (1999) previous studies on durable housing 
                                                 
3 There is a growing body of literature on the economics of urban sprawl surveyed in Glaeser and Khan 
(2004) and Nechyba and Walsh (2004). For important contributions to the modeling of the causes of 
sprawl, see Brueckner (2000), Cheshire and Sheppard (2002), Cheshire and Sheppard (2003), Burchfield et 
al. (2006) and Wu (2006). Wu and Platinga (2003) examined the effects of public open space policies on 
urban spatial structure; Bento et al. (2005) examined the impacts of sprawl on vehicle ownership, vehicle 
miles traveled and public transit ridership. Wash (2007) evaluates open space policies in a locational 
equilibrium model that incorporates the endogeneity of both privately held open space and land conversion 
decisions. Platinga and Bernell (2005), and Eid et al. (2007) examined the link between urban sprawl and 
obesity.  
4 In related work, Anas and Rhee (2006) provide a numerical appraisal of congestion tolls and UGBs in a 
city that is congested but differs substantially from the standard monocentric model. Their city has 
dispersed, instead of centralized, employment, and intracity travel consists of both commuting and 
shopping trips. Brueckner (2007) re-examined the effectiveness of UGBs as second-best instruments in a 
monocentric congested city. In a companion paper, Bento et al (2008) examine the welfare effects of 
development taxes and urban growth boundaries in a model similar to the one developed in this paper. 
5 Empirical evidence suggests that permamently preserved open space is substantially more valuable than 
temporary preserved open space. See, Irwin (2002) for further discussion.  
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ignore the production of new housing supply and do not address alterations or replacements of the 
existing housing stock.  
Third, because the existing housing stock is heterogeneous, we are able to analyze how 
different landowners (depending on their spatial location) respond to a development tax when 
revenues are earmarked to finance a subsidy to improvements. In addition, we are also able to 
capture the effects that improvement subsidies targeted at blighted areas indirectly produce in 
other housing markets as residential rents adjust. A key feature of our model is the presence of 
neighborhood effects, which influence landowners when deciding on the level of improvements 
on the existing housing stock. This feature is relevant to measure the potential investment 
multiplier effect that emerges from a subsidy on improvements, as empirical work suggest that 
maintenance behavior of individual homeowners is influenced by those of their neighbors (e.g. 
Galster (1987), Spivack (1991), Ioannides (2002)). 
Our analytical model compares the efficiency effects of three alternative revenue-recycling 
policies: purchase of conservation easements, subsidizing revitalization at the city core, and the 
‘textbook’ approach of recycling revenues lump sum to all landowners in the economy. The 
introduction of a development tax generates two primary sources of welfare. First, the 
capitalization effect, which is the efficiency gain associated with households responding to the 
higher level of open space by increasing their bids for housing. Second, the size-effect, which 
represents the primary cost associated with the reduction in the total amount of land developed at 
the urban fringe. When the revenues from the development tax are returned lump sum, these are 
the two only welfare effects of the development tax, confirming previous findings by Brueckner 
(2001) and Bento el al. (2006). In this case, the optimal development tax should be set at the point 
where the capitalization effect net of the size effect equals zero and corresponds to the traditional 
Pigouvian tax. It should be note that, as a result of the development tax, some owners of land at 
the urban fringe decide not to convert land, and therefore, there is an increase in the temporary 
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level of open space. We use the term temporary here to stress the fact that, under this policy, 
nothing prevents developers from future conversion of open space into residential development.  
 However, to the extent that households place an additional premium on permanently 
preserved land relative to temporary open space, as suggested by empirical literature (e.g. Irwin 
(2002)), when revenues from the development tax are instead earmarked to fund a conservation 
easement program, the capitalization effect is higher under this policy than when revenues are 
returned in a lump sum fashion, implying a higher optimal development tax. This is because  
under a conservation easement program, there is no threat of future conversion of the preserved 
open space. 
Alternatively, when revenues are used to subsidize a revitalization program at the urban core, 
there are three additional sources of welfare: first the revenue-recycling effect, which represents 
the efficiency gain associated with using the revenues from the development tax to subsidize 
improvements of the existing housing stock in the blighted areas; second, two interaction effects: 
The city-suburb and city-fringe interaction effects. When development tax revenues are 
earmarked to finance the improvements of the existing housing stock at the city core, the price of 
housing in neighborhoods near the city boundary is reduced. This occurs because households’ 
utility from living in neighborhoods far from the blighted area decreases when housing decline at 
the city core is reduced. This impact on housing prices has two opposing efficiency effects. First 
it produces a loss in residential land values for neighborhoods located between the city core and 
the urban fringe.  We denote this effect the negative city-suburb interaction effect.  Second, the 
pressure to convert land into residential use at the city boundary is reduced, and thus so are the 
costs of saving open space. This additional efficiency gain is the positive city-fringe interaction 
effect. Under plausible parameter values, we find that the revenue-recycling effect and positive 
city-fringe interaction effect dominate the negative city-suburb interaction effect. As a 
consequence, the second best development tax should be set above its Pigouvian level.   
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We also compare the distributional effects for the three policies using a calibrated simulation 
model.  Under a lump sum recycling policy, residential landowners throughout the city bear the 
costs of the policy, while non-residential landowners receive a benefit from revenue-recycling.  
Under a conservation easement policy, residential landowners near the urban boundary receive 
the benefit of the easements, while urban landowners nearer the city center bear the cost of the 
tax.  Finally, under a revitalization subsidy, landowners in the urban core receive a large benefit 
from a revitalized housing stock, while landowners near the urban boundary bear both the cost of 
the tax and the decrease in rents due to the negative city-suburb interaction effect.  It is clear that 
these alternative policies differentially affect communities throughout the metro area. Because 
none of the policies considered improve welfare for all landowners, regional coordination is 
necessary to achieve the potential efficiency benefits from a recycled development tax.  Regional 
planners can expect support from those communities that benefit from a particular recycling 
policy, and resistance from those bearing the cost of the policy. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analytically decomposes the 
efficiency channels of a development tax under the three alternative recycling policies. Section 3 
supplements the analytical model with a simulation model. Section 4 presents our results and 
finally, section 5 offers conclusions. 
 
2. Analytical Framework 
2.1. Model assumptions 
We develop a static model of an open city in which a representative household enjoys utility from 
housing , a composite consumption good , open space  and is adversely affected by 
neighborhood decline . The household utility function is represented by: 
)(H )(Z ))(( xO
))(( xD
( ) ))(),(,,( xDxOZHuU                                                                                                      (2.1) 
 8
where is continuous, quasi-concave and weakly separable in )(⋅U )(⋅u , and .)(xO )(xD 6 The 
household budget constraint is given by: 
txypHZ −=+                                                                                                                  (2.2) 
where p is the rental price of H , y is household income, t  is the transportation cost per mile and 
x  is distance, in miles, from the place of residence to the place of work. For simplicity, we set the 
price of the composite good equal to unity. Households choose x , Z and H to maximize utility 
(2.1) subject to the budget constraint (2.2), taking the level of open space and neighborhood 
decline as given. From the resulting first-order conditions and (2.2) we obtain the uncompensated 
demand functions for the composite good and housing, condition on x : 
),,,( xptyZ  and                                                                                            (2.3) ),,,( xptyH
Substituting these equations into (2.1) gives the indirect utility function: 
)),(),(,,,( xxDxOptyV                                                                                                      (2.4) 
For any given structure of housing prices in the city, households prefer those locations that 
provide the highest level of utility. In equilibrium, the usual spatial arbitrage argument implies all 
locations that are occupied by households must have rents that allow a common level of utility 
V to be achieved. Therefore, a representative household chooses x that maximizes (2.4) and 
p adjusts so that: 
VxxDxOptyV =)),(),(,,,(                                                                                              (2.5) 
Equation (2.5) implicitly defines the housing bid rent function as: 
),),(),(,,( xVxDxOtyp                                                                                                      (2.6) 
Equation (2.6) describes the maximum rent per unit floor area that a household is willing to pay at 
distance x  from the CBD if it is to receive a given level of utilityV . The slope of the housing bid 
rent function (2.6) is given by: 
                                                 
6 The separability restriction implies the demands for H and Z do not vary directly with changes 
in and .  )(xO )(xD
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                                 (2.7) 
While higher commuting costs make more distant locations less attractive, higher benefits from 
open space have the reverse effect. In addition, if central city decline increases demand for non-
urban housing, housing bid rents will continue to rise in the suburbs. Therefore, the bid-rent 
function (2.7) can have a positive or negative slope over distance from the CBD. 
 
Open space 
Consistent with the empirical evidence (e.g. Irwin (2002), Geoghegan (2002), Geoghegan et 
al. (2003)), the valuation of open space depends on its accessibility and on whether it is 
developable or protected from future development: 
⎩⎨
⎧
>≥≤≤−−
−<≤=
0,)(
00
)(
dxxxxforxxOj
xxxfor
xO
O
O
μμμ                                       (2.8) 
where x denotes the urban boundary and  is the distance from the urban boundary up to where 
open space amenities exist. is the rate at which open space amenities decline with distance.
Ox
)(⋅j 7 
is the total amount of open space andO μ  represents the value of the open space to households. 
If O  is developable dμμ = ; if O  is permanently protected dμμ > .  
 
Neighborhood decline 
A neighborhood is defined as a ring of houses at distance x  miles from the CBD. 
Neighborhood decline ( ) depends on the physical deterioration of the neighborhood’s 
housing stock ( ) and on the neighborhood’s proximity to blighted areas ( ): 
)(xD
)(xQ )(xA
))(),(()( xAxQDxD =                                                                                                        (2.9) 
                                                 
7 This function satisfies , ,0/)( ≥∂⋅∂ xj 0/)( 22 >∂⋅∂ xj 0)( =− xxj for all [ ]Oxxx −∈ ,0  and . 1)0( =j
 10
where is a continuous convex function. We assume that )(⋅D 0
)()(
)(2 >∂∂
∂
xAxQ
xD , which implies a 
complementarity relationship between the physical deterioration of the neighborhood’s housing 
stock ( ) and the neighborhood’s proximity to blighted areas ( ).  )(xQ )(xA
We define the blighted area as a set of neighborhoods which exhibit positive physical 
deterioration . The physical deterioration of the housing stock occurs because of age 
and lack of improvements to quality. The average physical deterioration of the blighted area 
produces spillovers to surrounding neighborhoods that decrease with distance from the blighted 
area. Households within the blighted area feel the full negative effects of spillovers. Outside the 
blighted area, spillovers can negatively affect utility for households in adjacent neighborhoods up 
to  miles from the CBD, and spillovers can positively affect utility for households beyond . 
This increase in utility from living far from the blighted area results in a flight to the suburbs. The 
spillover effects from proximity to the blighted area are represented by: 
)(xQ )(xQ
Ax Ax
⎩⎨
⎧
>−
≤≤=
∫
BB
B
B
B
xxifxxf
xxif
x
zdzzQ
xA
x
)(
01
2)(
)( 2
0
π
π
                                                        (2.10) 
where  is the geographic extent of the blighted area.Bx )(⋅f
(
is the rate at which spillovers from 
the blighted area decrease with distance and is such that 0) >− Bxxf  for  and is 
 for .
AB xxx ≤≤
0)( <xf − Bx Axx > 8  
 
Production of housing  
There are two types of housing stock in our model: an existing housing stock and a new 
housing stock. The presence of an existing housing stock can be explained by the durable nature 
of housing itself. There are two types of land use: residential and agriculture. We assume that 
                                                 
8 This function satisfies  and . 0/)( ≤∂⋅∂ xf 0/)( 22 >∂⋅∂ xf
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land and the housing stock are owned by absentee landowners and that the agricultural rent per 
unit of land is exogenous and equal to . ar
When land is allocated to residential use, the landowner combines land  with capital 
to produce housing. Assuming constant returns to scale in the housing production function, 
we can express the housing supply as a function of the capital-to-land ratio: 
)(L
)(K
L
KS =                                                                                                                             (2.11) 
S  is a proxy for housing density or building height and is a concave function representing 
housing supply per unit of land. 
)(Sh
 
Existing housing stock 
The existing housing stock in a neighborhood is exogenous and exhibits a level of physical 
deterioration given by the level of deterioration of the housing stock net any improvements to 
quality ( ): )(xI
)()()( xIxQxQ −= δ  with QxQ ≤⋅≤ ),(0                                                                     (2.12) 
where Q is the maximum physical deterioration of the existing housing stock. )(xδ is the 
exogenous rate at which physical deterioration decreases with distance. Given (2.12), 
improvements to quality satisfy: 
)()(0 xQxI δ≤≤  with 0/)( <∂∂ xxδ                                                       (2.13)                                 
When 0)( =xδ buildings have no physical deterioration and there is no need for improvement 
activity ( ). When0)( =xI 1)(0 ≤< xδ , buildings exhibit some degree of deterioration and there 
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is room for improvement ( ) up to a maximum0)( >xI )(xQδ .9 Total improvements in the 
blighted area are given by: 
∫= B
x
xdxxII
0
2)( π                                                                                                               (2.14) 
Given (2.6), (2.9), (2.11) and (2.13), at each distance x  from the CBD, both improvements at 
that distance, , and total improvements in the blighted area, )(xI I , are capitalized into housing 
prices: 
0
)(
)(
)(
)(
)(
),( >∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
⋅∂
xI
xQ
xQ
xD
xD
xp                                                                                                      (2.15) 
and 
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                                                                      (2.16) 
From (2.15), an increase in the level of improvements at distance x from the CBD decreases 
the physical deterioration of the neighborhood’s housing stock ( 0
)(
( ) >∂
∂
xI
Q x
), which reduces 
neighborhood decline,
(
(
∂
∂
Q
D 0
)
) <
x
x
. This in turn, increases housing prices at distance x from the 
CBD, 0
)(
),( <∂
⋅∂
xD
xp
.  
From (2.16) the effect of total improvements in the blighted area is felt throughout the city. In 
particular, an increase in the overall level of improvements within the blighted area has two 
opposing effects. First, the reduction in the aggregate level of housing decline within the blighted 
area increases housing prices within and in the proximity of the blighted area up to miles from Ax
                                                 
9 The function )(xδ also satisfies , 0/)( 22 <∂∂ xxδ 1)0( =δ and 0)( =Bxδ . Therefore, assuming cities 
tend to develop from the center outwards over time, absent of improvement activities the most deteriorated 
structures are found at the city center. 
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the CBD. Second, reducing housing decline also reduces households´ utility gain from living far 
from the blighted area, which implies a smaller suburban flight effect and therefore, a decrease in 
housing prices past  miles from the CBD. Ax
Landowners who own existing housing stock decide the level of new structural density and the 
level of improvements to quality in order to maximize their total rent per unit of land subject to 
the level of physical deterioration (2.12) while taking the rental price (2.6) and total 
improvements (2.14) as given. For these landowners, total rent per unit of 
land, ),),()),((),(xSe
)(
p
xI
(Sn
),(,,( xVxAxIQxOtyre , is given by: 
))(),(())(())()((),(),(
),(
xIxSCxSCxSxShxMaxxr e
I
n
S
nexSn
e −−+⋅=⋅                 (2.17) 
where  are total convex construction costs and  are total convex 
improvement costs.  is the new structural density and  the existing structural density. 
The marginal productivity of is assumed to be decreasing with , reflecting the 
increasing difficulty of adding new units of housing as density increases.
))(( xSC n
S ))(),(( xIxSC e
I
)(xe
(xSe
)x S
)(xSn )
10 
Note from (2.16) that, because aggregate improvements are positively capitalized into 
housing prices up to miles from the CBD, a landowner’s marginal return of housing 
improvements within the blighted area increases with aggregate improvements. Therefore, each 
individual improvement decision yields external benefits which enhance the profitability of other 
individual’s housing improvements, implying
Ax
0)( >
Id
xdI . Because landowners take aggregate 
improvements as given, they are not able to recognize this investment externality when deciding 
their individual housing improvement. However, we assume landowners can revise a posteriori 
their improvements decisions once the new aggregate housing improvement is known. 
                                                 
10 The rationale for this type of adjustment costs of the housing stock is given in Lucas (1967) and 
Hochman and Pines (1982).  
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In the absence of government intervention, we assume the optimal choice of improvements is 
zero for all landowners: 
0),(* =⋅ xI ,                                                                                                    (2.18) Bxx ≤≤0
 
New housing stock 
The new housing stock results from new construction activities in the outer neighborhoods of 
the urban area. Because landowners choose the land use that maximizes the return of their plot of 
land, if the return in agriculture is less than the return in residential, a plot of land is converted 
into residential use. For landowners who produce new housing, total rent per unit of 
land, ),),(),(,,( xVxAxOtyrn , is given by: 
))(())((),),(),(,,(),(
)(
xSCxShxVxAxOtypMaxxr n
S
nxSn n
−=⋅                                      (2.19) 
 
Closing conditions  
Finally, the two closing conditions of the model require that the residential land rent must 
equal the exogenous agricultural rent at the urban boundary ( x ):11 
an rxVxAOtyr =),),(,,,( μ                                                                                              (2.20) 
The city limit is established in the land market and is implicitly determined by (2.18) as: 
),),(,,,( arVxAOtyx μ                                                                                                     (2.21) 
Note from (2.20) and (2.21) that due to its externalities, the concentration of physical 
deterioration at the city core influences bid rents at the urban boundary and hence the city’s 
                                                 
11 Note that OxxOjxO μμ =−= )()( . 
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spatial size. Furthermore, landowners do not take into account all the benefits of open space when 
converting land into residential use, which reinforces urban sprawl.12 
The second closing condition of the model requires that the city population fits inside the 
urban boundary: 
N
Nxdx
xxVptyH
xhx =⋅∫ π2)),,,(,,( )(0                                                                                   (2.22) 
where 
)),,,(,,(
)(
xxVptyH
xh
⋅ is the population density at distance x miles from the CBD.  
Given an exogenous utility level,V , the price of housing is determined for each location by 
(2.6). Given ),,( xVp ⋅ and the stock of housing, , the number of households accommodated 
in the city as a whole is determined by (2.22). 
)(xh
Figure 1 illustrates the spatial layout of the city. Up to Ex  miles from the CBD there is an 
existing housing stock exhibiting suboptimal quality up to miles. Conversion of agricultural 
land into residential use occurs up to 
Bx
x  miles from the CBD.  
 
2.2. Welfare Measurement  
With this framework, we can now calculate the efficiency impacts of a policy intervention. We 
note that prior to a policy intervention, total value of land in the city, R , is given by the sum of 
total value of land in residential use with total value of land in agriculture use: 
∫∫∫ +⋅+⋅=
m
x
a
x
x
n
x
xdxrxdxxrxdxxrR
E
E
e πππ 22),(2),(
0
                                                        (2.23)  
                                                 
12 The social value of the land around the city includes the agricultural rent it earns and all the open space 
benefits it generates: xdxxN
xZU
xOUr
x
a π2)()(/
)(/
0
∫ ∂∂ ∂∂+ , where )( )()( xH xhxN = . 
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where m denotes the geographic extent of potentially developable land. The efficiency impacts of 
the policy are calculated as changes in the value of land resulting from the policy intervention.  
 
2.3. Development tax with Lump Sum revenue-recycling 
First consider the impact of a development tax with revenues returned lump sum to all 
landowners. Let be a tax per unit of land developed. The efficiency effects of a marginal 
increase in  can be expressed as: 
Dt
Dt
[ ]
444444 3444444 21
4444444444 34444444444 21
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D
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⋅∂= ∫
−
                                    (2.24) 
where 
Dt
x  is the geographic extent of the city under the lump sum development tax and ),(* xSn ⋅ is 
the new structural density. The term labeled CdR in (2.24) represents the capitalization 
effect. The capitalization effect equals the sum of the willingness to pay for open space by each 
household who increase their bids for housing.  The term labeled SdR in (2.24) r sents the 
size effect. This effect is the cost associated with the reduction in the total amount of land 
developed and is given by the reduction in the return of land due to the change in land use 
induced by the policy. Because only households near the urban fringe benefit from open space, 
the capitalization effect will only benefit those households.  Furthermore, because revenues are 
returned lump sum, there is a wealth transfer from landowners with developed land to those with 
undeveloped land.   
optimal 
epre
 
2. 4. Development tax with revenues used to subsidize improvements in the city core 
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Now consider the effects of the development tax with revenues used to subsidized improvements 
in the city core. The efficiency effects of a marginal increase in  under this recycling policy are 
given by (see Appendix A): 
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where g  is the subsidy per unit of housing improvement and 
Dt
x  the geographic extent of the 
city under the development tax. The overall increase in housing improvements is given by: 
1
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A comparison of (2.24) and (2.25) suggests that, when revenues of development taxes are 
earmarked to subsidize improvements in the city core, both policies produce the same 
capitalization effect and size effect. However, the overall efficiency effects of a revitalization 
policy differ from the lump sum return in two important dimensions. First, in contrast to the lump 
sum policy, revitalization also produces an additional welfare effect given by in (2.25). We 
denote this effect, the revenue-recycling effect, which is the welfare gain from development taxes 
that results from earmarking the revenues to revitalization in the city core. This equals the wedge 
RdR
 18
between the marginal social benefit of improvements and the subsidy multiplied by the overall 
increase in housing improvements. Note from (2.26) that the overall increase in housing 
improvements has two terms. The first term on the right-hand side of (2.26) represents the direct 
increase in individual improvements induced by the subsidy on improvements. The second term 
captures the investment multiplier generated by the positive feedback of aggregate improvements 
into individual improvements ( 0),( >∂
⋅∂
I
xI ), which magnifies the impact of the subsidy on 
housing improvements.  Also note that the benefits of revitalization are explicitly spatial, as 
landowners up to  benefit from improved neighborhood quality.   Ax
The second difference is that spatial connectivity between housing submarkets creates 
interaction effects beyond the city center. and  represent the city-suburb and city-
fringe interaction effects, respectively. When development tax revenues are earmarked to finance 
the improvements of the existing housing stock at the city core, both the demand and the price for 
housing in neighborhoods beyond  miles from the CBD is reduced. This occurs because 
households’ utility from living in neighborhoods far from the blighted area decreases when 
housing decline at the city core is reduced. This impact on housing prices has two opposing 
efficiency effects. First it produces a loss in residential land values for neighborhoods located 
between and 
CSdR FdR
Ax
Ax Dtx miles from the CBD. This efficiency loss is captured by the term in 
(2.25) and we denote this effect as the negative city-suburb interaction effect.  Second, it reduces 
the pressure to convert land into residential use at the city boundary and thus, the cost of saving 
open space. This additional efficiency gain is captured by the term ; the positive city-fringe 
interaction effect. 
CSdR
FdR
Thus, when comparing a lump sum return to a revitalization policy, it is clear that if the net 
benefits of revitalization are positive, , a revitalization policy is more 
efficient than a lump sum policy.  Furthermore, even if there are no benefits from preserving open 
0>++ FCSR dRdRdR
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space, , if the net benefits of revitalization cover the size effect,  
, a revitalization policy would still be welfare improving.  To 
summarize the distributional impacts of this policy, all landowners with developed land pay the 
development tax, landowners near the city center receive a benefit from the revenue-recycling 
effect, while landowners near the fringe gain from the capitalization effect but lose from the city-
suburb interaction effect.   
0=CdR
CSdR ++ SFR dRdRdR >
  
2.5. Development tax with revenues used to purchase conservation easements 
Finally, consider the impacts of the development tax when revenues are used to purchase 
conservation easements. The efficiency effects of a marginal increase in the development tax in 
this case can be represented by (see Appendix A): 
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There are two key differences between this policy and the two previous policies. First, a 
comparison between (2.24), (2.25) and (2.27) shows that the capitalization effect of a 
development tax when revenues are used to purchase conservation easements (the term in 
(2.27)) is higher than the capitalization effect produced by the lump return or revitalization 
policy. This is because when revenues are allocated to purchase conversation easements, open 
space will be permanently preserved and therefore its value to households is higher. Under the 
other policies, individuals perceive that open space is only temporarily preserved and therefore 
their willingness to pay is lower, reflecting the potential threat of future development.   
CEdR
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Second, the size effect of this policy is greater than the size effect of the lump sum policy, and 
greater than the size effect under a revitalization policy. Because conservation easements raise the 
value of land, restricting development comes at a greater cost.  Thus, both benefits and costs of 
land preservation under conservation easements have increased.13  In contrast to the lump sum 
return, undeveloped land receives no wealth transfer and landowners who sell their development 
right are exactly as well off as they were in the absence of the policy.  
A comparison of (2.24), (2.25) and (2.27) also reveals that the efficiency of a development 
tax depends greatly on how revenue is recycled.  A priori, however, it is not possible on 
efficiency grounds to determine from the analytical model whether revenues should be earmarked 
to finance improvements in the city core or used to purchase conservation easements. Nor is it 
possible to determine the distributional impacts of each policy. In the calibrated simulation model 
we are able to quantify the magnitude of the different capitalization, size and revenue-recycling 
effects and therefore rank the instruments.  Using a simulation model, we also look at a cross-
section of the metro area and determine the spatial impacts of each policy both in terms of who 
benefits/loses, and the relative magnitudes of the effects.    
 
3. Simulation Model  
In this section we discuss the parameter values used to calibrate our simulation model and the 
solution algorithm. The simulation model allows us to rank the revenue-recycling instruments and 
also allows us to determine the distributional impacts of each policy.  In addition to the three 
policies considered in the analytical section, we also consider a “hybrid” policy where 
development tax revenues are used to purchase conservation easements, with the remaining 
revenue used for revitalization.  The parameter values discussed in sub-section 3.1 are based on 
the empirical literature and on Census Data (2000). We then describe in sub-section 3.2 the 
                                                 
13 Though a formal proof is not provided here, the increase in capitalization should outweigh the increase in 
costs if the benefits of open space are non-point (
DtO
xx ≠ ) 
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computation of the equilibrium algorithm, which consists of two nested algorithms-a strategic 
behavior algorithm and a policy algorithm.  
 
3.1. Parameter Values 
Table 1 summarizes the parameter values used in our benchmark. 
Valuation of Open Space: Despite several studies on the value of farmland (McConnell and 
Walls (2005)), there is still uncertainty over an average willingness-to-pay (WTP) for farmland 
preservation. For our benchmark, we set 00004.0=γ and 5.0=φ  to generate an average 
aggregate WTP of $20 per acre for developable farmland, approximating the conservative values 
suggested in McConnell and Walls (2005). In addition, we set 24=μ so that the total average 
WTP for one acre of permanent protected farmland is three times greater than for one acre of 
developable farmland (Irwin (2002), Geoghegan (2002)).  Finally, we set and 2=Ox 1=λ so 
that the spillover effects of open space amenities are concentrated within the first 2 miles from the 
open space area (McConnell and Walls (2005)). 
Valuation of improvements: There is also uncertainty regarding households WTP for housing 
improvements, due to a lack of empirical studies.14 Given the aggregate nature of the model, we 
calibrate the WTP for housing improvements consistent with the values provided by studies that 
use property value gains as a proxy for benefits of housing rehabilitation programs (Schill et al. 
(2002), Ellen et al. (2003)).  For our benchmark, we set 000004.0=v and 2=θ  to generate a 
moderate aggregate WTP for housing improvement equal to $1.25 per dollar of subsidy spent.15 
In order to capture the positive feedback of aggregate improvements into individual 
improvements as suggested by the empirical literature (Ioannides (2002), Ioannides and Zabel 
(2003)), we set 2=ϕ .  
                                                 
14 See DiPasquale (1999) for a review on the main themes in the empirical literature on housing supply. 
15 For exemple, Ellen et al. (2003) find that an expenditure of $3.7 billion dollars in total public subsidies 
resulted in a property value increase of $6.8 billion dollars, meaning, for every dollar of subsidy spent, it 
resulted in $1.84 increase in property values. 
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Flight to the suburbs: In our benchmark, we set 5.0=ξ  so that the positive spillover at the 
city boundary due to blight flight is equal to that of the negative spillover at .Bx
16 
Physical decay parameter )(δ : While we are unaware of any studies that explicitly measure 
the decay of housing stock with respect to distance from a central business district, a data-
oriented snapshot from the 2001 American Housing Survey-National Sample of the 
characteristics of the existing housing stock in 2000 provides some insight into the choice of δ .17 
A value of 5.0=δ  captures the basic features of this snapshot, with older decayed units 
concentrated in the city center, and newer housing units as we approach the edge of the blighted 
area. 
Spillover effects of the blighted area )(ρ : Our spillover effects were calibrated to mimic 
studies by Ellen et al. (2002, 2003) and Schill et al. (2002) which suggest that the impact of the 
disamenity in blighted areas becomes quite small at a distance of 2000 feet, and disappears as one 
move even further away from the blighted region. Ellen et al. (2002) investigated the 
neighborhood price impacts of the Nehemiah program and the Housing Partnership program in 
New York City during the 80’s and 90’s. They identified a positive home price impact for both 
programs, with the impact attenuating over distance from the developments: 11% within 500 feet, 
6% at 1000 feet and 3% at 2000 feet, which would imply that 1=ρ .18  
 
3.2. The Equilibrium Algorithm  
The computation of the equilibrium consists of two nested algorithms: a strategic behavior 
algorithm and a policy algorithm. The strategic behavior algorithm solves for a Nash equilibrium 
                                                 
16 Note that )](][1/[)( Bt xAxA d −−= ξξ . 
17 We focused on housing units built 82 years or more ago (old units) and compared their characteristics 
with those of units built after 1990 (as new units).   
18 On the other hand, Ellen et al. (2003) find that prices in the blighted area were 28% lower, at 500 feet 
20% lower, at 1900 feet 5% lower, and at 2000 feet around 2% lower, corresponding to 2=ρ .  Adopting a 
larger ρ  would slightly diminish the revenue-recycling effect as fewer households benefit from recycling. 
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amongst landowners, who optimize their profits with respect to densities and improvements. In 
the spirit of Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002), we numerically solve for the equilibrium 
improvement function that maximizes residential land rent at each location within the blighted 
area, which yields equilibrium housing bid rents and residential land rents for the system. This 
solution is then nested within the larger policy algorithm and is used to compute the welfare 
impacts of a development tax for different amounts of land saved. The sequence of interactions 
from the policy algorithm concludes when 1) no household would prefer to live in a ring other 
than the one it actually lives in; 2) land is allocated to its most profitable use; 3) no landowner has 
incentive to deviate from his improvement level choice; 4) the government budget constraint is 
balanced; and 5) the number of households equals the population of the city.  
Figure 2 provides a graphical example of the strategic behavior algorithm convergence. 
Consistent with the analytical model, the curve  represents landowners’ initial 
improvement decision in response to the subsidy.  The subsequent curves, , represent 
landowners’ iterative response to aggregate improvements, until the process converges to the 
equilibrium curve .The bell shape of the improvements function is due to neighborhood 
effects and the heterogeneity of the existing housing stock.
)(0 xI
)(xI n
)(* xI
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4. Numerical Results 
This section presents results from the numerical model. Section 4.1 and 4.2 compare the marginal 
welfare effects of the different revenue-recycling policies and the spatial distribution of total 
benefits to landowners located at different distances from the CBD. Though we have carefully 
calibrated the simulation model, it should be noted that our emphasis is on qualitative rather than 
quantitative differences across policies.  
                                                 
19 Near the CBD, a large existing housing density implies large costs of improvements and additional new 
construction.  Near the edge of the blighted area, marginal benefits of improvements are small, due to a low 
level of decline.   
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 4.1. Marginal Welfare Effects  
We first examine the marginal welfare effects to landowners of alternative anti-sprawl policies. In 
figure 3, the horizontal axis measures the percentage of land saved and the vertical axis measures 
the marginal welfare effect, where a positive value indicates a benefit and a negative value a cost.  
The main goal of this figure is to decompose the different sources of efficiency discussed in 
section 2 and discuss their contribution to the overall welfare of the different policies. 
LSMW represents the marginal welfare effect of a lump sum development tax. This curve 
represents the two opposing efficiency channels exploited by this instrument: the capitalization 
and size effects. This curve has a positive intercept due to the capitalization of open space, and is 
downward sloping, reflecting the increasing marginal cost of saving land.  The crucial point from 
this curve is that while the capitalization effect is significant for low levels of saved land, the 
contribution of the size effect to the costs of the policy quickly increases. This increase in the size 
effect quickly drives benefits to zero. This is not surprising, because as more land gets saved, we 
more towards the city center where housing prices are higher and thus residential land is more 
valuable. From the figure, the optimal level of land preservation under  lump sum return is 
approximately 3.5%, where the intercepts the horizontal axis. After 3.5% the costs of 
preserving land would outweigh the benefits. 
LSMW
CEMW
MW
shows the marginal welfare effect of saving land under the development tax when 
revenues are used to purchase conservation easements. The vertical distance between this curve 
and the isolates the increase in capitalization effect due the permanent nature of the open 
space that is saved through the easement. Consistent with empirical evidence (Irwin (2002)), if 
households perceive that open space will be permanently preserved, their willingness to pay is 
about 2.5 times higher. As a consequence, the optimal level of savings under this policy is 8%. 
LS
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IMW shows the marginal welfare effect of a development tax when revenues are used for 
revitalization through financing improvements at the city core. The vertical difference between 
this curve and reflects the combination of the revenue-recycling effect – which is the 
additional benefits generated from reducing urban decline at the city center – the decrease in 
benefits due to the negative city-suburb interaction effect, and the increase in benefits from the 
city-fringe interaction effect due to a decrease in the flight-to-the suburbs. For lower amounts of 
land saved, the differences in welfare of this policy relative to the lump sum highlight the large 
benefits of revitalizing the city core. However, as more and more funds are diverted to the city 
center, the additional gains from improvements rapidly decrease. The optimal level of land saved 
under this policy is about 7%, about 2.33 times higher than under the lump sum return.  On the 
other hand, the optimal amount of land saved under this policy is less than under a conservation 
easement policy, though the total benefits of the revitalization policy (the integral of the areas 
under the curves in figure 3) exceed those under the conservation easement policy.  Because of 
the large benefits of financing improvements in the city core, even if the benefits of preserving 
open space are equal to zero, our simulations suggest that one should still save about 6.5% of land 
through development taxes just to raise revenues to revitalize the city core. 
LSMW
Finally, the curve gives the marginal welfare effect of a development tax under the 
“hybrid” policy of conservation easements and subsidies to improvements. An identical amount 
of revenue is raised by this policy relative to the pure revitalization policy; however a fraction of 
that revenue is used to purchase permanent conservation easements, while the remaining revenue 
is used to fund revitalization.  The difference between  and  represents the 
additional benefits from purchasing conservation easements net the decrease in benefits from less 
money going towards revitalization.  This policy has the greatest total benefits and largest optimal 
amount of land saved of around 8.5%.     
ICEMW +
ICEMW + IMW
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4.2 Distributional Impacts 
We now consider the distribution of total gross benefits to different landowners across the metro 
from saving 8% of land. 8% was chosen as a point of comparison because it is the optimal level 
of land savings under the conservation easement policy. Choosing a different level of savings 
merely alters the magnitudes, but not the relative structure of the distribution effects.  Figure 4a 
compares the total gross benefits across policies to different landowners inside the city (up to 4 
miles from the CBD). We remind the reader that the blighted area consists of 3.5 miles. Figure 4b 
looks at landowners beyond 4 miles from the CBD (the suburbs and urban fringe, roughly 
speaking).  
   shows the distribution of total benefits throughout the city under the development tax 
when revenues are used to finance a revitalization program. This curve highlights several 
important features of the model: First, housing stock improvements only take place between 2.5 
and 3.5 miles from the CBD, as shown through the large benefits to those landowners. To the left 
of 2.5 miles and to the right of 3.5 miles the total growth benefits of the policy are still positive 
reflecting the spillover benefits from improvements.  Looking at Figure 4b, suburban landowners 
experience a loss due to the tax and the decrease in rents due to a decrease in flight to the suburbs.  
Finally, landowners who switch land uses from residential to farmland experience the loss in the 
triangle from 6.85 to 7.15 miles.  
IGB
ICEGB + gives the distribution of total benefits throughout the city under the development tax 
when revenues are combined to finance a revitalization program and purchase conservation 
easements. This curve illustrates that the loss in total gross benefits at the city center from 
allocating part of the revenues to conservation easements is negligible. This is not surprising 
since the amount of money allocated to purchase the easement (that is the size effect at the urban 
fringe) only represents 4% of the total amount of revenues generated; or in other words, it is not 
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extremely expensive to purchase 8500 acres of easements.20  Because the development right of 
land beyond 6.85 miles has been purchased through the easement, landowners there are exactly as 
well off as they were before.   
LSGB and denote, respectively, the gross benefits under the lump sum and  
conservation easement policies. Because the benefits of preserving open space are concentrated in 
the suburbs, these policies produce no benefit in the city center.  As the conservation easement 
produces greater capitalization benefits, landowners receive greater benefits of preserving open 
space than under the lump sum policy.  Comparing the total effect to landowners nearer the city 
center, we see that the conservation easement has a much smaller cost to those landowners than 
the lump sum policy.  This is because the conservation easement only needs to raise enough 
revenue to purchase the development rights corresponding to 8% of land saved, while the lump 
sum policy needs to increase the tax until the landowner corresponding to 8% of land saved is 
indifferent between residential and agricultural use.  Finally, while the conservation easement has 
no impact on agricultural owners, the lump sum policy of returning revenues to all landowners 
has the effect of subsidizing agricultural land at the expense of developed residential land.  
CEGB
Figures 4a and 4b make clear that each policy has a very different spatial imprint on the 
metro area.  The revitalization and “hybrid” revitalization policies concentrate benefits near the 
CBD and losses in the suburbs and urban fringe.  The conservation easement and lump sum 
policies on the other hand, produce benefits for landowners far from the city center (suburban 
landowners for the conservation easement and agricultural landowners for the lump sum) at the 
expense of urban landowners.  Given these distributions of benefits and costs, it is clear that 
coordination will be difficult, as no policy is Pareto improving for all landowners.  Thus, these 
results echo the call by analysts for a regional coordination entity capable of setting urban policy 
across metro jurisdictions.  
                                                 
20 The purchase of the conservation easement only entails the purchase of the development right, which is 
equal to the difference between the returns from residential and agricultural use. 
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 5. Conclusions 
This paper uses consistent, spatial analytical and numerical simulation models to demonstrate the 
efficiency and distributional effects of a metro-wide development tax with alternative recycling 
policies.  We analytically decompose the welfare effects of a development tax when revenues are 
recycled under three scenarios: lump sum return to all landowners, purchase of conservation 
easements, and subsidy of improvements in the urban core.   The analytical results highlight the 
importance of spatial connectivity of housing submarkets throughout the city, leading to 
interaction effects between urban, suburban, and fringe housing markets.   
Because of the benefits of revenue-recycling, the lump sum return policy performs the 
worst, with an optimal land saved of only 3%. Conservation easements and revitalization policies 
create additional benefits, and therefore generate larger amount of optimal land saved: 8% and 
7% respectively. When revenues from the development tax are used to purchase conservation 
easements at the fringe, the resulting capitalization effect is higher than when revenues are 
returned lump sum. In turn, if revenues finance a revitalization program at the city core, the 
development tax exploits three additional sources of welfare (all absent in the two previous 
policies): the revenue-recycling effect, which is the additional welfare gain from using the 
revenues of development taxes to subsidize improvements in the blighted areas of the city-core; 
the city-suburb interaction effect, which is a welfare loss that results from the reduction in 
residential rents in the suburbs; and the city-fringe interaction effect, which is the welfare gain 
that results from removing the pressure for development at the fringe, reducing the costs of saving 
land. Since the combination of these three effects is to produce a welfare gain, development taxes 
with revenues used to finance an improvements subsidy should be set above its first best 
Pigouvian level. 
This result has a clear implication for policy analysis and suggests that, even when there is 
uncertainty about the benefits of open space, just the revenue-raising characteristic of the 
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development tax per se justifies a tax that saves 3.5% of land, suggesting that the second best 
development tax should be set above its Pigouvian level. Our results also suggest that the bulk of 
the gains from anti-sprawl policies come primarily from the revenue-recycling effect and less so 
from the benefits of saving open space. 
The simulation model also compares the distributional impacts of the alternative policies.  
Revitalization concentrates benefits at the city center, while the lump sum and conservation 
easement policies produce benefits much farther from the CBD.  No policy is welfare improving 
for all landowners, suggesting that regional coordination bodies would be needed to capture the 
potential gains from revenue-recycling suggested by the analytical model and marginal welfare 
simulations.   
There are a number of limitations to our analysis that might be worth relaxing in future work. 
First, we abstract from zoning regulations and redevelopment restrictions. It would be useful to 
explore how these pre-existing policies may restrict the density adjustments predicted by our 
model and therefore affect the benefits from the revenue-recycling effect. While we suspect that 
pre-existing zoning regulations will not alter the main findings of our work, they will certainly 
affect the magnitude of the welfare gains from the revenue-recycling effect.  The impacts of 
zoning may also vary across space, altering the distributional impacts as well.   
Second, we could allow for other causes of urban sprawl and distortions within the urban 
system, such as traffic congestion and agglomeration economies, and perhaps a polycentric urban 
spatial structure. For example, it would be useful to examine the efficiency and distributional 
effects of development taxes and urban growth boundaries and consider recycling policies that 
may alter the transportation network capacity. Similarly, we abstract from the fact that housing is 
subsidized through tax exemptions for imputed income and that the current tax system fails to 
charge developers for complementary infrastructure inputs. In part, some of these pre-existing 
distortions are offset by property taxes. 
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Third, we abstract from city open space, and therefore, do not consider the potential 
substitution between open space inside the city, open space at the fringe and lot size. However, as 
documented in Anderson and West (2006), the value of different kinds of open space interacts 
with densities, distance to the central business district and other spatial amenities. While we 
suspect that a more careful treatment of open space will not change the qualitative results of our 
work, it is certainly the case that the resulting urban spatial structure of the city will be different.   
 
Appendix A.  
Deriving equations (2.25) and (2.26) 
The government budget constraint when the revenues from the development tax are earmarked to 
fund subsidies to housing rehabilitation satisfies: 
2
DtD xtIg =                                                                                                                            (A.1) 
For landowners who own the existing housing stock, total rent per unit of land can be written 
as: 
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where  is given by (2.6). From the first-order conditions of the maximization problem on 
the right-hand side of (A.2) we obtain the supply of structural density and housing improvements, 
conditional on 
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For landowners who produce new housing, the return per unit of land is given by: 
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By setting (A.5) evaluated at 
Dtxx = qual to the agricultural rent and eliminating  e Dtx fro (A.5) 
using (A.1), we derive: 
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which implicitly defines as a function of O. Therefore, in order to evaluate the efficiency effect 
of a development tax, the choice variable can be view as O instead of , with a particular O 
corresponding to a particular . Differentiating the city total aggregated land value (2.23) with 
Dt
Dt
Dt
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respect to O  while taking into account (A.1)-(A.6), yields the efficiency effects of a development 
tax expressed as (2.25). By differentiating (2.13) while taking (A.4) we obtain (2.26). 
 
Appendix B.  
Functional Forms of the Simulation Model 
Households’ preferences are represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function:  
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where α  denotes the percentage of income net of transportation costs spent on housing; γ  and v  
represent, respectively the household valuation of open space and neighborhood decline; and φ  
and θ  are respectively, the elasticity of utility with respect to open space amenities and 
neighborhood decline. The amenities from open space are represented by: 
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where λ  is the rate at which open space amenities decline with distance. 
The subutility for neighborhood decline is represented by a C.E.S. function: 
[ )/11/(1/11/11 )()()( ϕϕϕ −−− + xAxxD ]= Q                                                                              (B.3) 
where ϕ  is the degree of complementarities between private improvements. The physical 
deterioration of the existing housing stock is given by: 
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where δ  is the rate at which physical deterioration decreases with distance. The spillover effects 
of the blighted area are computed as: 
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where ρ  is the rate at which the negative spillovers from the blighted area decrease with 
distance.ξ  is a parameter that captures household valuation for suburban residence. The value of 
)1/( −ξξ  gives the positive effect of living near the city boundary.21 
                                                 
21 Note that . 0lim )( =−−+∞→ B
xx
x
e ρ
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The housing floor area produced per unit of land is described by a CES function: 
11
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where β  is the share of capital in the production of housing and σ  is the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and land in the production of housing.  
Total costs of improvements are quadratic and convex, following Hall (2004): 
2)())(()())(())(),(( xIxShxIxShpxIxSC eee
I
I ω+=                                                         (B.7) 
where ω  is the improvement cost adjustment factor per square feet of existing housing stock and 
 is the price of improvements per square feet of existing housing stock.  Ip
Construction costs are linear and given as.22 
)())(( xSpxSC nkn
S =                                                                                                         (B.8) 
where is the price of capital per unit of capital. kp
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 Figure 3: Marginal Welfare Effects 
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 Figure 4a: Total Gross Benefits in City Center 
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 Figure 4b: Total Gross Benefits in Suburbs 
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Table 1: Parameters used to calibrate the model 
Description of the Parameter  Parameter Value
Geographic extent of the existing housing stock 5.2 mi.
Historical household income $39,000
Household income $40,000
Transportation cost per mile $600
Percentage of income net of transportation costs spent on housing 0.4
Household valuation of open space 0.00004
Elasticity of utility with respect to open space amenities 0.5
Distance from urban boundary up to where open space amenities exist 2 mi.
Rate at which open space amenities decline with distance 1
Elasticity of utility with respect to neighborhood decline 2
Household valuation of neighborhood decline 0.000004
Geographic extent of the blighted area 3.5 mi.
Rate at which physical deterioration decreases with distance 0.5
Geographic extent of negative spillovers from the CBD 4.5 mi.
Maximum physical deterioration of the existing housing stock 100
Rate at which negative spillovers from decline decrease with distance 1
Degree of complementarity between private improvements 2
Household valuation of suburban flight 0.6
Elasticity of substitution between capital and land in the production of housing 0.8
Share of capital in the production of housing 0.99
Price of capital per unit of capital $9
Price of improvements per square feet of existing housing stock $0.28
Improvement cost adjustment factor per square feet of existing housing stock $0.000005
Agricultural rent per acre $80
Exogenous utility level 7380
Geographic extent of potentially developable land 10 mi.
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